PORT MOURANT LTD. v. FINGAL

 PORT MOURANT LTD.

v.

FINGAL

[In the Full Court, on Appeal from the Magistrate's Court for the Berbice Judicial District (Date and Gordon, JJ.) June 17, October 7, January 6, 28, 1961.]

Workmen's compensation—Workman injured while acting beyond sphere of ordinary work-Extra work was for masters benefit, within workman's competence, and suck as master might reasonably have required workman to do—Whether accident arose out of and in the course of the workman's employment—Workmen's Compensation Ordinance, Cap. 111, s. 3.

Appeal from magistrate's court—Memorandum of reasons for decision—Findings on all disputed questions of fact should be specifically set out.

The respondent workman was employed by the appellant company to operate a water pump. As a result of a message brought to him by a person who was not employed by the appellants and who had no authority over him, the respondent left the pumping station and went to the water-side 60 to 70 rods away. There he met one S, a fellow employee, in charge of a tug. The tug was not owned by the appellants but had come to tow punts with canes from their estate to Albion Estate. The latter was a separate company but operating in close collaboration with the appellants. The respondent was an engineer who had previously worked on launches, and at the request of S, who however had no authority over him, he assisted S in repairing the generator of the tug. Whilst doing so his right hand was injured.

One of the major issues at the trial was whether there was a prohibition against the respondent assisting in repairing machinery not owned by the appellants unless authorised by a superior officer. The magistrate made no specific finding on this but found that "the applicant would have been required and expected to assist in repairing the tug." On appeal from an order of the magistrate awarding compensation to the workman—

Held: (i) a magistrate should endeavour to set out as specifically as possible in his memorandum of reasons for decision his findings on all questions of fact in dispute; however, implicit in the magistrate's finding that "the applicant would have been required to assist in repairing the tug" was a finding that there was no prohibition of the kind suggested;

(ii) there was ample evidence to support the magistrate's finding that it was reasonable to expect that the workman would be required to assist in repairing tugs coming to the appellants' estate in the circumstances of this case, so that the appellants' business would not be delayed or hampered, and that in consequence the accident arose out of and in the course of the workman's employment.

Appeal dismissed.

S. D, S. Hardyal for the appellants.

Ashton Chase for the respondent.

Judgment of the Court: This is an appeal against the decision of a magistrate of the Berbice Judicial District awarding the respondent $3,456.50 compensation and $120 costs under the Workmen's Compensation Ordinance, Cap. 111. The question to be determined is whether the injury sustained by the respondent arose out of and in the course of his employment with the appellants, Port Mourant Ltd., within the meaning of s. 3 of the Ordinance which is substantially the same as the corresponding provision in the English Act.

It was admitted or proved that on Sunday 1st December, 1957, the respondent was in the employment of the appellants. His work was to operate a water pump at the Brotherson Pumping Station, Long Hook, Canje Creek, Corentyne, and his shift was from 12 noon to 12 midnight. At about 2 p.m. one Randolph Luke, who was not in the employment of the appellants and had no authority over the respondent, brought a message to the respondent as a result of which the respondent spoke to his assistant Ramjit (also called Ramsammy) then left the pumping station and went to the waterside some 60 to 70 rods away. There he met one Sancho in charge of a tug that had come to tow punts with canes from Port Mourant Ltd. to Albion Estate, which is a separate company operating in close collaboration with Port Mourant Ltd. Something was wrong with the generator of the tug. At Sancho's request the respondent, who is an engineer and had previously worked on launches, assisted Sancho in repairing the generator. Whilst doing so the respondent received injuries to his right hand.

From the evidence it would appear that Ramjit was working under the respondent whose immediate boss was Nathaniel Moses. Moses was in charge of five pumps including the one at the Brotherson Pumping Station, the nearest of the other pumps being about thirteen miles from the Brotherson Pumping Station. A Mr. Harvey was superintendent in charge of all of the appellants' pumps. It is common ground that Harvey was nowhere near the Brotherson Pumping Station at the time of the accident. As to where Moses was is not clear. He admitted that he was not in the part of the pumping station where the respondent works when the respondent left to go to the tug, but said he was in the compound. The respondent maintained that the first time he saw Moses that day was immediately after the accident. The magistrate has not made any specific reference to this part of the evidence in his memorandum of reasons for decision. We think however that the proper deduction to be drawn from the evidence as a whole is that at the time when Luke called the respondent for Sancho, Moses was not far from where the respondent was working but that the respondent was unaware of this.

At the trial the respondent, testified that the tug belonged to the appellants. Robert Christiani, the appellants' assistant personnel manager denied this, saying:

"Applicant [now respondent] was working for the Port Mourant Ltd., at the Brotherson Pumping Station. Sancho also worked for the Port Mourant Ltd. On the day applicant was injured Sancho was in charge of a tug; this tug is not owned by Port Mourant Ltd.........I do not know who is the owner of the tug. Sancho comes under my personnel administration."

The magistrate found that the tug was not owned by the appellants and added:

"The witness Christiani was unable to say who was the owner of the said tug but he admitted that Sancho who was in charge of the said tug is an employee of the respondents" [now appellants].

Before us counsel for the appellants urged that the magistrate's interpretation of Christiani's evidence as meaning that Sancho was an employee of the appellants on the day of the accident is unreasonable and that all that Christiani should be taken to mean is that Sancho had at some time or other worked for the appellants. We do not agree. There was no cross-examination of Christiani on the point, and we think that both on the question of ownership of the tug and on the question of the employment of Sancho by the appellants the magistrate was entitled to find as he did on the evidence before him. It should be noted, however, that there was no evidence that Sancho was a superior officer of the respondent.

In this court counsel for the respondent confirmed that the respondent's claim is not that he acted in an emergency but that his case comes within the second and fourth of the four classes of cases mentioned by Lord Guthrie in Beattie v. Tough and Sons (1916), 10 B.W.C.C. at p. 453: 

"With regard to the circumstances in which an injured workman may be entitled to recover compensation under the Act, in addition to the three cases of (1) direct order or employment, (2) request by another workman, and (3) necessity or emergency, another category has been recognised, namely, injury received in the course of work, which an employer or his manager might reasonably have required the workman to do, or, had they been present, would be reasonably expected to acquiesce in his doing, the said work being (a) for the master's benefit, and (b) such as the workman was competent to perform."

The fourth class mentioned by Lord Guthrie falls within the first of the two broad divisions propounded by MacKinnon, L.J., in Dermody v. Higgs and Hill Ltd., [1937] 1 All E.R. at p. 382:

"There are two classes, and the first kind of act, though not strictly one that the man is employed to do may be treated as one within the scope of his employment if it is a reasonable or necessary thing for such a workman to do. That was like the case of Menzies v. M'Quibban (1900), 2 Fraser 732. But there is the second class of act which is clearly not within the scope of his employment at all, but may be brought within it. It is an act done to deal with, or avert, an emergency threatening his employers' interests, as in such a case as Culpeck v. Orient Steam Navigation Company Ltd. (1922), 15 B.W.C.C. 187, If my chauffeur sees the gardener carrying a heavy ladder, which is obviously rather a heavy task for him, as some of his proper work, and lends him a hand, that comes within the first class, and is a reasonable and proper thing for him to do, because it is merely lending a hand to his fellow workman. But, if the chauffeur attempts to seize a burglar whom he sees attacking the house, and is wounded by the burglar, that is not part of his employment, as not arising out of his employment as a workman. It is arising from an emergency, and done in the interests of his employer because of that emergency."

This distinction is emphasized in the 33rd Edition of Willis's Workmen's Compensation. At p. 74 it is stated that the difference is that in the first class of case mentioned by Mackinnon, L.J., the workman purported to be acting within the sphere of his employment whereas in the second he was doing an act which was beyond that sphere.

In his memorandum of reasons for decision the trial magistrate said:—

"I found as a fact that the applicant had done repairs to engines on tugs before the date of the accident. The witness Nathaniel Moses called by the respondents supports applicant's testimony that he (applicant) repaired tugs before. In fact the witness Moses had assisted both Sancho and applicant in repairing tugs. Moreover, Sancho and applicant had worked together on tugs.

"Although the applicant was employed to work at the pump it is reasonable to expect that he would be required to assist in repairing tugs coming to the respondents' estate in the circumstances of this case, so that the respondents' business would not be delayed or hampered. Indeed, the witness Christiani admitted that the estates work in close collaboration with each other in the matter of production of sugar. Christiani also admitted that a superior officer to the applicant could have ordered applicant to effect repairs on the tug. I therefore hold that the applicant in assisting to repair the said tug was doing something he was required and expected to do by the respondents and therefore the accident arose in the course of his employment. I accept Dr. Lachmansingh's evidence as to the condition of applicant's hand. I also believed the testimony of the witnesses Randolph Luke and Ramjit.

******

"I therefore found as a fact..............that the accident arose out of and in the course of the applicant's employment, having found that the applicant would have been required and expected to assist in repairing the tug which would be in the interest of his employers, the applicant's act not amounting to serious and wilful misconduct."

The grounds of appeal relied on by counsel for the appellants are that the magistrate's decision is erroneous in point of law and is one which the magistrate viewing the evidence reasonably could not make, for the following reasons:—

(a) The respondent's employment to work on engines was before the appellants closed down their factory, and not on the date of the injury.

(b) Sancho could not give directions to the respondent to work on a tug not the property of the appellants so as to make the appellants liable.

(c) The respondent at the time of the injury was not working with the appellants in the course of his employment, nor did the accident arise out of the employment, as it was not within the scope of his employment that he was assisting Sancho on a tug not the property of the appellants.

Paragraph (a) of the grounds of appeal relates to the reference made to Moses' evidence by the magistrate in his memorandum of reasons for decision. The relevant portion of Moses' evidence is as follows:—

"The applicant worked under me that day...........Sancho could not have taken applicant out of my supervision to do any work on that tug. Applicant was under my supervision for about six to seven years and he never had anything to do with any tug save and except the estate launch. About three years before applicant was in charge of the estate launch. Applicant had no right to go on that tug..........I know applicant was once in charge of a tug by the name of the 'Navigator'. I know that whilst applicant was in charge of that tug it needed repairs. I know applicant did repairs to that tug 'Navigator'. I have done repairs to the 'Navigator'. Applicant used to work intermittently on the pumping station and on the tug. Applicant and Sancho have worked together on tugs. I have assisted both Sancho and Fingal in repairing tugs .........Applicant was in charge of the 'Navigator' about five years ago."

It was argued that the magistrate did not appreciate the distinction made by Moses between work on tugs and launches owned by the appellants and work on tugs and launches not so owned. It seems to us, however, that the magistrate's reference to this part of Moses' evidence was merely to show that it supported the respondent's claim that he (respondent) was competent to do repairs to engines on tugs.

As regards paragraph (b) of the grounds of appeal, it is sufficient to observe that the magistrate did not find that Sancho had authority to order or authorize the respondent to work on the tug in question. The magistrate found that this case falls within the fourth of the classes of cases mentioned by Lord Guthrie in Beattie v. Tough and Sons (ubi supra).

As regards paragraph (c) of the grounds of appeal, it was contended by counsel for the appellants that the magistrate failed to address his mind to what was an important issue at the trial, namely, whether under the terms of the respondent's employment he was forbidden to do work on machinery not belonging to the appellants unless specially authorized to do so by a superior officer. On this aspect of the case the respondent is recorded as having said:

"Whilst working at the said pump I was called off to do odd engineering jobs elsewhere. The foreman of the respondents had called me off from the pump to look after engines on tugs before. From the years 1942 to 1956 I worked as an engineer on a launch. Heywood [another foreman apparently] called me to do engineering work apart from the pump. Sancho saw me doing engineering work before that day......I was in charge of the pump. If I am called to go elsewhere my assistant would be left in charge at the pump. It is part of my duties if anything is wrong in the compound or anything to be done in the compound, for me to go and do it...............I have done repairs to the said tug before that day. It is part of my duty to assist Sancho. Mr. Harvey and other engineers of the estate had told me it was part of my duties to assist in anything wrong with any machines belonging to the said estate. I assisted Sancho about two times on the said tug apart from this occasion. I helped to start the said engine and cleaning the injectors to the engine..... I have done repairs to boats belonging to the estate before 1st December, 1957.....There was no notice prohibiting me from going on the tug or any launch of the said estate."

But Christiani, who was called by the appellants, said:

"On the day applicant was injured Sancho was in charge of a tug; this tug is not owned by Port Mourant Ltd. Generally, if something went wrong with the tug an employee of Port Mourant Ltd. would not be called to work on that tug. An employee of Port Mourant Ltd. would not be required to work on any machinery or property belonging to another estate........Even if Sancho had sent for applicant to effect repairs to the tug the applicant would be required not to go and he is forbidden under the terms of his employment to do so unless authorized by a superior officer, such as his foreman, the person in charge of the said pumping station or member of the senior staff of the estate....A superior officer could have ordered applicant to go on the tug to effect repairs to it. The Port Mourant Ltd. office is about 10 miles from the Brotherson Pumping Station. Mr. Harvey lives on the Port Mourant Estate compound about 10 miles from Brotherson Pumping Station..........I cannot say whether at the commencement and during the time of the accident applicant's terms of employment were set out in writing. I have never seen any printed notice around the said pumping station forbidding employees of the station to work on tugs. I do not know applicant worked on a launch before. Assuming Mr. Smith (General Manager) or Mr. Harvey had ordered applicant to do work on the tug and applicant had refused, I would say that his refusal would be treated with disfavour by them."

And Ramjit, who was called by the respondent and whose testimony was believed by the magistrate, said:

"I am an engineer. I never repaired, any tug or launch. If Mr. Harvey the boss tells me to do any other work than the pumping station work I would do it. My sole work is to work at the pump. All people, working at the pump, including Fingal, are to work solely at the pump unless authorized to work elsewhere by Mr. Harvey. If Sancho had sent for me I would have refused to go.......... I only work at the pumping station. The order of the estate is to work only at the pumping station. This order applies to all employees at the pumping station. Only Fingal and I were at the pumping station that day. On that day I was working under Fingal. If Fingal had told me to go to the launch I would have gone."

Much of the latter part of the quoted evidence of the respondent (given under cross-examination and re-examination) relates to work on machines "belonging to the said estate" (meaning the appellant company). It should perhaps be here mentioned that the respondent was the first person to give evidence at the trial. In examination-in-chief he said that the tug in question "belongs to" the appellants. It appears that it was never put to him under cross-examination that this was not the case.

Where, as in this instance, no written judgment is delivered by the trial magistrate, he should, on notice of appeal being given, endeavour to set out as specifically as possible in his memorandum of reasons for decision his findings on all questions of fact in dispute. We think it would have been preferable for the magistrate to have stated his findings of the primary facts in this case in greater detail; it certainly would have saved us a good deal of time; but we are not persuaded that he overlooked the very important question whether there was a prohibition against the respondent assisting in repairing machinery not owned by the appellants unless authorized by a superior officer. The point had been raised and stressed and was, indeed, one of the major issues in the case. Our considered opinion is that implicit in the magistrate's finding that "the applicant would have been required and expected to assist in repairing the tug" is a finding that there was no prohibition of the kind suggested.

There was ample evidence oh which the magistrate could find as he did and we see no sufficient reason for disturbing his decision that the injury suffered by the respondent arose out of and in the course of his employment with the appellants.

This appeal is accordingly dismissed and the magistrate's award is affirmed, with costs to the respondent fixed at $25.

Appeal dismissed.

ABRAMS v. THE MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNING BODY OF THE ANGLICAN SCHOOLS IN B.G. AND OTHERS

 ABRAMS

v.
THE MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNING BODY OF THE ANGLICAN SCHOOLS IN B.G. AND OTHERS
[Supreme Court (Luckhoo, CJ. (ag.)) January 12, 15, 21, February 3, April 23, 1960]
Crown servant—Not incorporated—Whether suable in official capacity.
Justices Protection Ordinance, Cap. 18—Wrongful dismissal of teacher—Employment and dismissal of teachers incidental to statutory duties—Whether protection attracted.
Natural justice—Dismissal of teacher for criminal conviction—No departmental inquiry—Whether dismissal a nullity—Education Ordinance, Cap. 91, ss. 47—51, and Education Code, Cap. 91, reg. 59.
The first-named defendants were the governing body and the third-named defendant, Jones, was their manager of Cane Grove Anglican School. The plaintiff was employed by the governing body as a teacher at the school. Regulation 51 of the the Education Code, Cap. 19, provides that the appointment, terms of employment, payment, promotion, transfer, and termination of employment of teachers shall rest directly with the governing bodies subject to the prior approval of the Director of Education, the second-named defendant. On July 21, 1954, the plaintiff was convicted on a summary charge, and was on this ground later dismissed by the governing body with the approval of the Director of Education. Notice of this decision was given by the manager by letter dated 10th January, 1955, but the governing body had held no previous inquiry and had not given the plaintiff any opportunity of exculpating himself. Eight months after his dismissal and without previously serving any notice of intended action under the Justices Protection Ordinance, Cap. 18, the plaintiff sued for a declaration that the dismissal was null and void, an injunction and damages for wrongful dismissal.
Held: (i) the second-named defendant, the Director of Education, is a Crown servant and not a body corporate; as such he is not therefore a legal person and cannot be sued;
(ii) the first-named defendants were entitled to the protection of the Justices Protection Ordinance, Cap. 18, both as to time and notice, since the employment and dismissal of teachers was a necessary incident in the performance of their statutory duties;
(iii) where a competent court has pronounced judgment on a criminal charge laid against a teacher it is not necessary for an inquiry to be made by a board in respect of the same charge.
Judgment for the defendants.
L. F. S. Burnham and Dr. F. W. H. Ramsahoye for the plaintiff.
J. H. S. Elliott for the first-and third-named defendants.
S. S. Ramphal, Solicitor-General, for the second-named defendant.
LUCKHOO, C.J. (Ag.) This is a claim by the plaintiff against the defendants jointly and severally for—
(a) a declaration that the dismissal of the plaintiff by the third named defendant Jones from his employment as a second-class certificated assistant teacher at the Cane Grove Anglican School was unlawful, null and void;
(b) an injunction restraining the defendants from preventing the plaintiff from exercising his duties as such second-class certificated assistant teacher at the Cane Grove Anglican School.;
(c) $10,000 as damages for wrongful dismissal;
(d) a declaration that the action of the first-named defendants, the members of the Governing Body of Anglican Schools in British Guiana, and/or the second-named defendant, the Director of Education, in adopting and/or ratifying and/or acquiescing in the third-named defendant’s dismissal of the plaintiff was unlawful, ultra vires, null and void;
(e) an injunction restraining the defendants and every of them from dismissing or interdicting the plaintiff from his post as a second-class certificated teacher at Cane Grove Anglican School or any other suitable primary school within the Colony.
A statement of agreed facts was filed in the action on March 5, 1957, and at the hearing before me it was agreed by counsel for all parties that this statement would take the place of and be in substitution for evidence on oath and the hearing of the action proceeded on that basis.
Counsel for the plaintiff at the hearing abandoned all claim to an award of special damages.
The statement of agreed facts filed is as follows:
Agreed Facts
1. The first-named defendants are and were at all material times the governing body, and in control, of the Anglican Schools, including the Cane Grove Anglican School, in the Colony of British Guiana.
2. The third-named defendant was nominated manager of the said Cane Grove Anglican School by the first-named defendants and was at all material times so acting, the first-named defendants having delegated to him all their powers in regard to the said school except the appointment or termination of appointment of head teachers and first-assistant teachers of which delegation the first-named defendants informed the second-named defendant in writing.
3. The plaintiff was by letter of appointment dated March 22, 1954, and signed by the third-named defendant appointed as from May 1, 1954, a Class II assistant teacher at Cane Grove Anglican School, an aided school in the county of Demerara. The said appointment was approved by the second-named defendant, and was not an appointment of a head or first assistant teacher.
4. The said letter of appointment was in the following terms:
“ASSISTANTS
Circular letter	Address: St. Mark’s Vicarage
Enmore
	2nd March, 1954.
	No.	
Cane Grovz Anglican School
Sir,
You are hereby appointed Class II Assistant of the above-named school with effect from 1st May, 1954, at a salary of $95.00 a month.
2. You will be liable to be transferred from time to time, subject to the approval of the Director of Education, for duty as Assistant Teacher in any School under the control of the Governing Body of the Anglican Schools provided that no loss of salary is thereby incurred.
3. Your employment is subject to the provisions of the Education Code, as amended from time to time, and may be terminated by one month’s notice in writing on either side.
4. Your duties will be to undertake such teaching and supervisory duties as may reasonably be assigned to you by the Head Teacher, and to give religious instruction to the pupils as follows:— as directed by the Head Teacher.
5. A copy of a letter from the Director approving of your appointment is attached.
Yours faithfully,
	 Joseph H. Jones
		(Manager)
			 Cane Grove Anglican School.
Mr. Bertrand Abrams
Address: Golden Grove
	E.C. Demerara
Read and Noted
Bertrand Abrams
Class II Asst. Teacher
	Date: 24.3.54.”	
St. Andrew’s Anglican School
5. Pursuant to the said letter the plaintiff took up his said appointment and acted and was paid as such teacher until January 11, 1955.
6. On July 21, 1954, the plaintiff was convicted by the magistrate of the East Demerara Judicial District for being on June 10, 1954, in possession of prohibited publications contrary to s. 4 of the Undesirable Publications (Prohibition of Importation) Ordinance, and fined $25 or one month’s imprisonment in default. The complaint was filed on June 30, 1954, and made returnable for July 7, 1954.
7. On July 31, 1954, the plaintiff filed notice of appeal against the said conviction, and on August 3, 1954, lodged with the clerk of the court for the East Demerara Judicial District the sum of $25 to abide the costs of the said appeal, but took no further step in connection therewith, save that he paid the said fine of $25.
8. On January 8, 1955, the second-named defendant wrote to the third-named defendant as follows:
“No, 364/46.	Education Department,
	P.O. Box 41,
		British Guiana
		8th January, 1955.
Dear Sir,
Mr. Bertrand Abrams—Appeal
I desire to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated 6th January 1955, on the above named subject along with the enclosure.
As the Superintendent of Police has now informed you that Mr. Abrams has abandoned the appeal and paid the fine, he may now be dismissed in accordance with the ruling of the Law Officers for a breach of the emergency regulations.
Yours faithfully,
	(Sgd.) R. C. G. Potter.
Director of Education (Ag.)
Rev. J. H. Jones,
St. Mark’s Vicarage,
Enmore, E.G. Demerara.”
9. On January 10, 1955, the third-named defendant acting in accordance with the second-named defendant’s instructions, wrote to the plaintiff as follows:
“St. Mark’s Vicarage,
	Enmore, E.C. Demerara,
		10th January, 1955.
Mr. Bertrand Abrams,
Cane Grove Anglican School.
East Coast, Demerara.
Dear Sir,
As the appeal against your conviction has been abandoned and the fine paid, I have to inform you that, in accordance with the ruling of the Law Officers for the breach of the emergency regulations, you are dismissed from your post as a Cl. II Assistant Teacher in Cane Grove Anglican School as from 11th January, 1955.
Yours faithfully,
	(Sgd.) Joseph H. Jones
		Manager.”
10. Since January, 1955, the plaintiff has not carried out any duties as such Class II assistant teacher at the said Cane Grove Anglican School and has not received any salary.
11. On April 27, 1955, the plaintiff wrote to the second-named defendant as follows:
“Nabaclis,
	E.C. Demerara.
27th April, 1955.
The Director of Education,
Education Dept.
Dear Sir,
I hereby request that the full reasons be supplied to me which caused my dismissal from the post of Cert. Asst. Class II which I held on the staff of Cane Grove Anglican School until the date of my dismissal, the 11th January, 1955.
I was dismissed by a note received on the same day from the Manager Rev. J. H. Jones, and the clearest indication of the reasons for dismissal given by the note was that it accorded ‘with the advice of the law officers.’
This request is made in the interests of establishing clearer basis of my present position in keeping with the terms of Regulation 5 (1) (a) of the Education Code.
Thanking you,	I am,
Yours respectfully,
	(Sgd.) Bertrand Abrams.”
	
	
This action had come on for hearing on September 11 and 22, 1958, before Stoby, J., who on the latter date reserved decision in the matter. Unfortunately it was not possible for Stoby, J., to prepare and deliver judgment before proceeding in December, 1958, to take up his appointment as Chief Justice of Barbados. Thereafter, for various reasons the re-hearing of the matter could not proceed until January 12, 1960.
It was submitted by the Solicitor-General on behalf of the second-named defendant, the Director of Education, that the Director is not as such a legal persona and accordingly cannot be made a defendant in any proceeding before the court.
Section 3 of the Education Ordinance, Cap. 91, provides that the Governor, with the approval of the Secretary of State, may appoint a Director of Education for the Colony who shall receive the salary or emoluments from time to time provided for that purpose by the Legislative Council, and who shall hold office during pleasure. The Director is a Crown servant and is not a corporate body.
The Solicitor-General cited the case of Raleigh v. Goschen, [1898] 1 Ch. 73, as authority for the proposition that actions will not lie against Crown servants in their official capacity. In that case the plaintiffs brought a claim against the defendants in their official capacity as Lords of the Admiralty with a view to establishing as against them that they were not entitled to enter upon, or acquire by way of compulsory purchase certain land, the property of the plaintiffs, and claiming damages for trespass and an injunction to restrain further trespass. It was held by Romer, J., that though the plaintiffs could sue any of the defendants individually for trespass committed by them, they could not sue them in their official capacity. Leave to amend by suing the defendants in their individual capacity was not granted the plaintiffs on the ground that to do so would be to change one action into another of a substantially different character.
In the present case it is to be observed that the action has been brought against the Director of Education as such without naming him. There is no enactment in British Guiana similar to the Crown Proceedings Act, 1947.
In Hutton v. Secretary of State for War (1926), 43 T.L.R. 106, it was held that it was not competent for the plaintiff to bring a motion for an injunction against the Secretary of State for War as such.
In Hosier Bros. v. Derby (Earl), [1918] 2 K.B. 671, an action was brought by the plaintiffs Hosier Brothers against the defendant, the Earl of Derby, who was described as His Majesty’s Principal Secretary of State for War, upon a contract entered into with them by the Secretary of State for War. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant had improperly used a steam engine and hay press for other than the purposes specified in the contract and claimed a declaration that the plaintiffs were entitled to compensation for the improper use of the engine and certain other declarations as to the construction and meaning of the contract. The defendant objected that the action was not maintainable on the ground that where a contract is made on behalf of the Crown, by a servant of the Crown, the remedy of the subject is by petition of right and not by action and no action would lie. It was held by the Court of Appeal that it was a general principle that a servant of the Crown who contracts on behalf of the Crown cannot be sued on the contract, and that an action can no more be brought against a servant of the Crown for a declaration as to what a contract means than it can be brought for a substantive remedy on the contract itself.
The Solicitor-General also cited the case of Bombay & Persia Steam Navigation Co. v. Maclay, [1920] 3 K.B. 402, in support of the proposition that procedural difficulties in the way of a plaintiff cannot be overcome by claiming a declaration against a public officer in his individual capacity. In that case the plaintiffs brought an action against His Majesty’s Shipping Controller appointed under the Defence of the Realm Regulations, who gave a direction under those regulations whereby the plaintiffs’ ship was diverted from her voyage. The plaintiffs thereby lost the use of their vessel for some days and incurred certain expenses. The plaintiffs sued the defendant claiming a declaration that they were entitled to compensation for the loss and expenses so incurred by them. It was not sought to sue the defendant for money payable by statute, but the question was whether, when a person had a demand of that kind, he could get a declaration of his rights against the Treasury by suing an official in his own name because he could not sue him in any other way. It was held by Rowlatt, J., that he could not.
Counsel for the plaintiff in this action has conceded that in so far as the claims for an injunction and for damages are concerned they would not be applicable to the Director of Education. He submitted, however, that the provisions of the Education Ordinance, Cap. 91, and of the Education Code support the view that the Director of Education is a corporate body. He cited the case of Carltona, Ltd. v. Commissioners of Works, [1943] 2 All E.R. 560, to show that where a government department or minister is incorporated it or he can be sued even though it or he may be acting as an agent of the Crown. It is to be observed, however, that in that case the point as to whether it was competent for the plaintiffs to sue the Commissioners of Works was not taken. I do not, however, agree with the contention of counsel for the plaintiff that the Director is an incorporated body. Counsel for the plaintiff referred to the case of Master Ladies Tailors Organisation v. Minister of Labour & National Service, [1950] 2 All E.R. 525, a case decided after the enactment of the Crown Proceedings Act, 1947, where an incorporated minister was sued and not an authorised department, but apparently no question was raised as to whether the proper defendant was before the court. I hold that the submission in limine of the Solicitor-General is well founded and that the claims against the second-named defendant the Director of Education are misconceived and must be dismissed with costs to be taxed to January 12, 1960.
It is now necessary to deal with the contention of counsel for the first- and third-named defendants that the provisions of s. 8 of the Justices Protection Ordinance, Cap. 18, are applicable to actions of this nature. Under the provisions of s. 8 (1) of that Ordinance, no action shall be brought against a justice for anything done by him in the execution of his office unless the action is commenced within six calendar months next after the act complained of has been committed. It is conceded by the plaintiff that this action was commenced some eight months after the act complained of had been committed. Section 8 (2) of the Ordinance provides that the action shall not be commenced against the justice until one calendar month at least after notice in writing of the intended action has been delivered to him, or left for him at his usual place of abode, by the party intending to commence the action, or by that party’s attorney or agent, wherein the cause of action and the court in which the action is to be brought shall be clearly and explicitly stated. It is conceded by counsel for the plaintiff that no notice of action was given any of the defendants.
Counsel for the defendants contended that by virtue of the provisions of s. 14 of the Ordinance the defendants are entitled to the protection of the provisions of s. 8 of the Ordinance. Section 14 provides that the Ordinance shall apply for the protection of all members of the police force, all constables, all district commissioners, and all other persons for anything done in the execution of their office under and by virtue of any Ordinance.
The provisions of the Justices Protection Ordinance, Cap. 18, were enacted in 1850 and are based on the provisions of the Justices’ Protection Act, 1848. The provisions of s. 2 of the Ordinance are identical with those of s. 1 of the Act save that instead of the words “shall be an action on the case as for a tort” in s. 1 of the Act, the words “shall be an action as for a tort” are used in s. 2 of the Ordinance. Those latter words were not introduced in the section, as junior counsel for the plaintiff suggested, because of the fact that under the Roman Dutch law which prevailed in the Colony in 1850 when the Ordinance was enacted there was nothing known to Roman Dutch law as a tort. If I have understood the Solicitor-General’s contention in this respect he is of the view that those words were introduced because it was intended that claims for breaches of contracts should be treated under the Ordinance just as if they were claims in tort. But it seems to me that the words “shall be an action as for a tort” were introduced because the provisions of the Act related to the protection of justices only for acts done by them in the execution of their office and such acts had nothing to do with breaches of contract. The case cited by the Solicitor-General in support of his contention that the provisions of the Ordinance apply to actions for wrongful dismissal is McManus v. Bowes, [1937] 3 All E.R. 227. That case arose under the provisions of the Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893. Section 1 of the Act provides:
“Where..any action, prosecution, or other proceeding is commenced in the United Kingdom against any person for any act done in pursuance, or execution or intended execution of any Act of Parliament, or of any public duty or authority, or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such Act, duty or authority, the following provisions shall have effect:
(a) The action, prosecution, or proceeding shall not lie or be instituted unless it is commenced within six months next after the act, neglect, or default complained of.”
In McManus’ case the provisions of s. 1 of the Public Authorities Protection Act were held to apply and Slesser, L.J. ([1937] 3 All E.R at p. 238), quoted the following passage from the judgment of Lord Buckmaster, L.C., in Bradford Corpn. v. Myers, [1916] 1 A.C. 242:
“In other words, it is not because the act out of which an action arises is within their power that a public authority enjoys the benefit of the statute. It is because the act is one which is either an act in the direct execution of a statute, or in the discharge of a public duty or the exercise of a public authority.”
Slesser, L. J. (ibid., at p. 238) then went on to say:
“In other words, if the only connection between the employment of Dr. McManus and the statute had been that the local authority would have to point to the statute as an enabling statute to give it power to make contracts with doctors on such terms as it thought fit, then I think it might well be argued that, this being an act which is not only within its power, but also an act in which it is free to make such contracts as it thinks fit, the case would be like the sale of the coal products in Bradford Corpn. v. Myers, [1918] 1 A.C. 242, and the Public Authorities Protection act would not apply … if the true view be that this appointment and removal are directly statutory, not by reason of any contract, but by reason of the operative language of the section itself, as I think is the case with such an office as this, where the officer holds office during pleasure, then I think that it follows that such a case is not a contract of the voluntary nature suggested in Bradford Corpn. v. Myers . . . but is a direct execution of the statute itself.”
The material words in s. 14 of the Justices Protection Ordinance, Cap. 18, in so far as they relate to the defendants are:
“This Ordinance shall apply for the protection of . . . all other persons for any thing done in the execution of their office under and by virtue of any Ordinance;”
and are in terms somewhat narrower than the provisions of s. 1 of the Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893.
It was contended by counsel for the plaintiff that the provisions of s. 14 of the Justices Protection Ordinance do not apply to breaches of contract. Counsel did not cite any authority in support of this contention. However, support for his view may be found in the older cases. For example, in Davies v. Swansea Corpn. (1853), 8 Exch. 808, it was contended by counsel for the plaintiff and conceded by counsel for the defendants that the Public Health Act, 1848, which required a notice of action to be given, did not apply to actions upon a specific contract and only applied to torts or quasi-torts. In Clarke v. Lewisham Borough Council (1902), 67 J.P. 195, where the action was one for wrongful dismissal, it was held by Bigham, J., that the Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893, was not intended to apply to breaches of contract. In Sharpington v. Fulham Guardians, [1904] 2 Ch. 449, where the action was for breach of contract, the defendants employing the plaintiff as an independent contractor to do works required by their public duties, Farwell, J., held that the Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893, did not apply to a private contract of the defendants. But in Lyles v. Southend-on-Sea Corpn., [1905] 2 K.B. 1, where a municipal corporation ran a tramway under statutory authority, a passenger sued the corporation for damages for negligence. Though arising out of a contract the action was in substance one for a tort. It was held that the Act applied but the Court of Appeal did not determine what the position would have been if the ticket issued to the passenger had contained special conditions.
In Bradford Corpn. v. Myers the Corporation were under a duty by statute to make gas and they also had the power to sell coke, a byproduct of making gas. They sold coke to Myers but by the negligence of their servants part of the coke was precipitated through Myers’ window. Myers brought an action against the Corporation, but not within six months, and the Corporation sought to rely on the Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893. The House of Lords, affirming the Court of Appeal, held that the act applied. In the course of his speech Lord Buckmaster, L.C., said that, in respect of the contention that the Act did not apply to actions for breaches of contract, the question could not be resolved by a simple distinction between questions of tort arising out of contract and questions of tort arising independently of contract, but the fact that actions on contracts made by local authorities had been held to be outside of the statute showed that the courts had considered that the words of the statute needed careful and strict scrutiny.
McManus v. Bowes, [1937] 3 All E.R. 227, is an authority against the contention of counsel for the plaintiff. By the Lunacy Act, 1890, s. 276 (1): “The visiting committee of every asylum shall appoint … (b) a medical officer … (f) such other officers and servants as they think fit”; and by s. 276 (3) of that Act: “The Committee may remove any person appointed under this section …”
It was held that both claims were out of time, being founded in each case on an alleged neglect or default in the intended execution of an Act of Parliament within the meaning of the Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893. Slesser, L.J., said ([1937] 3 All E.R. at p. 238):
“If the true view be that this appointment and removal are directly statutory, not by reason of any contract, but by reason of the operative language of the section itself, as I think is the case with such an office as this, where the officer holds office during pleasure, then I think that it follows that such a case is not a contract of the voluntary nature suggested in Bradford Corpn. v. Myers or in Sharpingion v. Fulham Guardians or in several cases which are there discussed, but is a direct execution of the statute itself.”
In that case, as the headnote states, an assistant medical officer at a mental hospital, who was employed under a contract containing no express reference to notice, was dismissed and paid three months’ salary in lieu of notice. He applied for superannuation allowance, but his application was refused by the Ministry of Health. Nearly six years after his dismissal he issued a writ against his late medical superintendent, various members of the hospital committee and the clerk of the hospital, alleging a number of causes of action including a claim against the committee for wrongful dismissal and insufficiency of notice and a claim for return of superannuation contributions.
In Griffiths v. Smith, [1941] 1 All E.R. 66, the plaintiff, the mother of one of the pupils of a non-provided public elementary school, was invited by the headmaster with the authority of the managers (who derived their powers under statute) to attend an exhibition of work held in one of the school buildings. She received injuries through a collapse of the floor and brought an action against the managers for damages outside of the time limited by the Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893. It was held by the House of Lords that the Act applied. In the course of his speech the Lord Chancellor, Viscount Simon, said ([1941] 1 All E.R. at p. 72):
“Lastly was the action of the managers in authorising the invitations to this school display an act done in the execution of their statutory duty or authority? It was strenuously contended for the appellants that this action was ‘voluntary’ in the sense in which the sale of coke in Bradford Corp. v. Myers was voluntary. It is true that St. Clement’s school could have been carried on without arranging to hold this display, but that is not the true test. The real question is whether the managers, in authorising the issue of invitations to the display on the school premises after school hours, should be regarded as exercising their function of managing the school.”
Lord Porter (ibid., at p. 91) expressed the view that in order that the act done should be held to be done in the exercise of a public duty, there must be a correlative public right.
In Turburville v. West Ham Corpn, [1950] 2 All E.R. 54, an education authority was authorised by statute, the Local Government Staffs (War Service) Act, 1939, to pay teachers employed by them and absent on war service such sum as would make up their remuneration in respect of war service to the amount of the salary received by them at the date of their being called up with such increments, if any, of their grades which they would have received but for such war service. The teachers had been employed on a scale of salaries laid down under statutory provisions. The terms of these provisions formed part of the contracts of service of the plaintiffs. By the remuneration of Teachers Order, 1945 (No. 1317 of 1945), the scale of school teachers’ salaries was increased as from April 1, 1945. The authority later informed the plaintiffs that they could not receive the benefits of the scale of 1945 as between April 1, 1945, and the date of their demobilisation, November, 1945. The plaintiffs sued the authority claiming that they were entitled to the benefit of the new scale. For the authority it was contended that the action was barred by the provisions of s. 21 of the Limitation Act, 1939 (a limitation provision similar to s. 1 of the Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893.) It was held by the Court of Appeal that the provisions of s. 21 of the Limitation Act, 1939, did not apply to the action, as the Local Government Staffs (War Service) Act, 1939, permitted but did not make it obligatory on the authority to augment the teachers’ remuneration for war service, and the payments of war service increments were not made for the benefit of the public but for the benefit of the employees and the failure to pay on the new scale of 1945 did not therefore fall within s. 21 of the Limitation Act, 1939. Lord Oaksey in the course of his judgment, after referring with agreement to the view expressed by Lord Porter in Griffith v. Smith, [1941] 1 All E.R. 66, that in order that the act should be held to be done in the exercise of a public duty, there must be a correlative public right, said that the teachers had no correlative right to the augmented payments which were entirely in the discretion of the appellants and that there was no finding that the payments were made in the interests of the school. Singleton, L.J., applied the test suggested by Lord Buckmaster, L.C., in Bradford Corpn. v. Myers and Wynn Parry, J., in his judgment said ([1950] 2 All E.R. at p. 64):
“As regards the applicability of s. 21 (1) of the Limitation Act, 1939, I agree that the original contracts between the defendants and the respective plaintiffs were made by the defendants in the direct execution of their public duty under the Education Act, 1921, s. 148 (1), and that s. 21 (1) of the Act of 1939 would apply to those contracts. I further agree that the effect of the resolution was to add to the contractual terms between the defendants and the respective plaintiffs. I do not agree, however, with counsel for the defendants that the result follows for which he contends, viz., that those terms are to be read into, or with, the original contracts so that it can be said of them that, just as s. 21 (1) of the Limitation Act, 1939, applies to the original contracts, so it must apply to the added terms. Such a result would be plainly contrary to the facts. Unlike the original contracts, the added terms were not brought into existence under or pursuant to the Education Act, 1921. Indeed they could not be justified under that Act. They were brought into existence by virtue of the Local Government Staffs (War Service) Act, 1939, s. 1, and the applicability or otherwise of s. 21 (1) of the Limitation Act, 1939, must be tested by reference to that Act. The effect of the Local Government Staffs (War Service) Act, 1939, s. 1, was to do no more than authorise the defendants, if they should think fit, to arrange with the plaintiffs, either as a voluntary act or as a contract, to make the payments mentioned in the section. If and so far as the defendants exercised that authority in any case, they did not do so, in my view, in pursuance or execution of any Act of Parliament or of any public duty or authority. All they did was to enter into a private arrangement with the plaintiffs, which, but for the statutory authority in question, they could not have done.”
The first and third-named defendants are a governing body and a manager respectively. They are in control and management of schools provided for elementary education by the Anglican Church in this Colony. These schools receive grants in aid from the Government.
The question to be determined in the present case is whether the employment of the plaintiff as a teacher is a necessary incident in the performance of a statutory duty of the defendants in the control and management of such schools. The Education Ordinance, Cap. 91, requires teachers with certain qualifications to be employed by the governing bodies of government aided schools.
Regulation 51 of the Education Code, Cap. 91 (Subsidiary Legislation) provides that the appointment, terms of employment, payment, promotion, transfer, and termination of employment of teachers shall rest directly with the governing bodies subject to the prior approval of the Director of Education. Regulation 52 provides for the terms of appointment of teachers to be embodied in a letter of employment from the governing body and paragraph (3) of that regulation provides that no letter of appointment shall contain anything contrary to the regulations. The qualifications of teachers, their salaries, pensions, discipline and leave conditions are all prescribed by Ordinance or by regulations having statutory effect.
The salaries of teachers in such schools are paid by the Government and the numbers and classes of teachers are prescribed by the Education Code.
The employment and dismissal of such teachers would in my opinion be a necessary incident in the performance of the statutory duties of the first-named defendants. They are bound to employ teachers to carry on their schools. In this respect see the passage in the judgment of Wynn Parry, J., in Turburville v. West Ham Corpn, [1950] 2 All E.R. 54, set out earlier in this judgment and see Clayton v. Pontypridd Urban Council, [1918] 1 K.B. 219.
In my opinion the provisions of the Justices Protection Ordinance, Cap. 18, apply to the present case and the plaintiff having failed to comply with the requirement to give notice of action as well as to bring the action within the period limited by s. 8 (2) of the Ordinance, his action must fail.
It was also argued by counsel for the plaintiff that in view of the fact that equitable remedies were claimed by the plaintiff the provisions of s. 8 of the Ordinance would not apply to the action. It was pointed out by Lord Maugham in his speech in the House of Lords in Griffiths v. Smith ([1941] 1 All E.R. at p. 76) that it was held in Graigola Merthyr Co., Ltd. v. Swansea Corpn, [1928] Ch. 31, that s. 1 of the Act of 1893 applied to quia timet actions, although the repeated references in the section to an act done and to neglect or default might well point to another conclusion. The case of White v. The Town Clerk of Georgetown, 1939 L.R. B.G. 144, cited by counsel for the plaintiff in support of his contention really only decides that the requirement of the statute as to notice of action would not apply to summary relief by injunction. If it did, the wrong might be irremediable and this could not be intended. The plaintiff’s action is not one of this type and I can find no authority in support of the contention of counsel for the plaintiff, and none was cited, that the requirement as to notice of action does not apply where equitable remedies are claimed.
Much of the argument advanced at the hearing of this action related to whether the dismissal of the plaintiff by the defendants is illegal and if so whether the appropriate remedy is one for a declaration or for damages for wrongful dismissal.
Counsel for the plaintiff submitted that it was necessary before the plaintiff could be legally dismissed for an inquiry to be first held by the governing body at which the plaintiff should be afforded an opportunity of exculpating himself and that as this was not done the purported dismissal of the plaintiff was a nullity, the appropriate remedy for which was an action for a declaration. In the alternative counsel contended that the plaintiff would be entitled to general damages for wrongful dismissal. Counsel for the first- and third-named defendants on the other hand submitted that the plaintiff was legally dismissed and that if he were not, the only appropriate remedy would be one of damages for wrongful dismissal. Counsel for the defendants contended that the relationship between the defendants and the plaintiff was one of master and servant and that if the plaintiff were wrongfully dismissed his only remedy is for damages and not for a declaration.
Both counsel for the plaintiff and counsel for the defendants referred to the case of Vine v. National Dock Labour Board, [1956] 3 All E.R. 939, and Barber v. Manchester Regional Hospital Board, [1958] 1 All E.R. 322, in support of their submissions. In Vine’s case the plaintiff, a registered dock labourer employed in the reserve port by the defendants, the National Dock Labour Board, was allocated work but failed to report to do the work. Like all dock workers he was employed under a scheme set up by the Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) Order, 1947. A complaint lodged with the Board was heard by a disciplinary committee appointed by the local labour board. The committee also heard the plaintiff’s explanation and agreed that he should be given seven days’ notice to terminate his employment with the Board. In accordance with the decision of the committee notice in writing was given to the plaintiff to terminate his employment with the Board and his name was removed from the register. The plaintiff appealed against the committee’s decision and his appeal was disallowed. The plaintiff brought an action against the Board claiming damages for wrongful dismissal and a declaration that his purported dismissal was illegal, ultra vires and void. It was held by the trial judge, Ormerod, J., and by the House of Lords that the plaintiff’s dismissal was invalid as the local dock labour board had no power under the scheme to delegate to a disciplinary committee their disciplinary powers given by the scheme and that the plaintiff was entitled to the declaration he sought. The Court of Appeal had held that damages were a sufficient remedy and that a declaration should not be granted.
It was the unanimous view of the law lords that the removal of the plaintiff’s name from the register was a nullity by reason of the fact that the Board had no power to delegate its disciplinary duties and that the proper remedy was one for a declaration. As was stated by Lord Morton of Henryton in his speech, these duties were of a judicial character and the decision of the local board may be of vital importance to the worker, as it may involve dismissal. In illustrating this aspect Lord Morton said ([1956] 3 All E.R. at p. 945):
“If, in an ordinary contract of service, a man is dismissed by his employer, it is open to him to seek and obtain employment in the same or another line of work with another employer; but the result of dismissal from employment under this scheme is wholly to remove the man from employment as a dock worker.”
Counsel for the plaintiff has contended that this passage means that the declaration would be granted where the defendants held a monopoly. Viewed in its context this is not the ratio decidendi of the decision of Lord Morton nor indeed of any of the other members of the House of Lords. I understand Lord Morton by this passage only to be stating why he was of the opinion that the disciplinary duties of the local board were duties of a judicial rather than of an administrative character and could not properly be delegated to a committee of the local board. Lord Somervell (ibid., at p. 951) has pointed out that in considering whether a body or a person has power to delegate the importance of the duty and the character of the person who would delegate it must be taken into consideration. He also (ibid., at p. 950) makes the point that not every failure to observe judicial procedure will vitiate proceedings which require judicial inquiry. It depends on the statutory or other provisions under which the matter arises. The dissenting judgment in the Court of Appeal of Jenkins, L.J., which was approved by the House of Lords clearly expresses the ground on which the declaratory order was made ([1956] 1 All E.R. at p. 9):
“Why should it be wrong, those being the plaintiff’s rights, for the court to make a declaration to the effect that his purported dismissal was ultra vires and invalid if in law he is to be regarded as still in the employment of the national board? For my part I can see no reason.”
The decision of the disciplinary committee was in effect no decision as in the first place they had no right to sit in judgment over the docker. There being in effect no decision the purported dismissal of the docker was ultra vires and invalid and it was as if he had never been dismissed. The obvious remedy was a declaration to that effect.
In Barber v. Manchester Regional Hospital Board, [1958] 1 All E.R. 322, Barry, J., held that “despite the strong statutory flavour attaching to the plaintiff’s contract” in essence it was an ordinary contract between master and servant and therefore there was no nullity in its termination. Counsel for the defendants contended that in the present case the plaintiff’s contract is very much in the same category as was Barber’s—it has a strong statutory flavour but it is an ordinary contract between master and servant.
Barber’s case is not of much assistance in this matter except that it shows that each case must be decided on its own facts.
From Vine’s case and Barber’s case may be deduced the following principles:
(a) where a person whose relationship to his employer is not one of master and servant is dismissed as the result of the action of a person or body to whom or to which were delegated functions which could not validly be delegated to him or it, the purported dismissal is ultra vires and invalid and a declaration may properly be made by a court to that effect;
(b) where a person whose relationship to his employer is not one of master and servant is dismissed as the result of the action of a person or body after a judicial or quasi-judicial inquiry required to be made, then the dismissal is valid or invalid depending upon whether there was not or there was failure of such a nature in the observance of the procedure required to be adopted at the inquiry which would vitiate the inquiry. If the dismissal is invalid a declaration may be properly made to that effect;
(c) where the relationship is merely one of master and servant the wrongful dismissal of the servant can only give rise to a claim for damages.
It is necessary first of all to examine the provisions of the Education Ordinance, Cap. 91, and of the Education Code (Subsidiary Legislation) to see whether in the circumstances of this case the plaintiff was legally dismissed.
Counsel for the first- and third-named defendants has conceded that the plaintiff’s dismissal was not effected under the provisions contained in any of the sections of the Education Ordinance itself.
Section 6 of the Ordinance provides for the reference to a magistrate for hearing of any charge made to the Director of Education against a teacher in an aided school alleging immoral conduct as a teacher or otherwise, or cruel or improper treatment of any children or pupils attending the school. The procedure for hearing such a charge is specified by s. 6. The magistrate does not proceed to conviction or acquittal but is required to transmit to the Director the evidence taken by him with a report of what in his opinion is the effect and weight thereof. By s. 7 if it is the opinion of the magistrate and the Director that a teacher is guilty of immoral conduct or of cruel or improper treatment of any of the children or pupils under his charge, the Director may cancel the teacher’s certificate or suspend its operation for such period as he may determine. Section 8 seeks to prevent a teacher whose certificate is cancelled or suspended from being employed in any school until he has been issued a new certificate or the period of suspension has expired as the case may be. Section 47 of the Ordinance provides for the reference by the Director to a board of inquiry for inquiry into any complaint against a teacher in an aided school where the teacher has in the opinion of the governing body failed to exculpate himself when given an opportunity so to do. Section 48 provides that the Governor in Council may make rules prescribing the procedure to be followed at an inquiry by any board appointed under s. 47. The Board is required to report its findings to the governing body and by s. 50, if after considering the findings of the Board the governing body and the Director, or either of them, is of the opinion that the teacher’s certificate shall be cancelled or suspended or any other penalty imposed, the matter shall be referred to the Education Committee appointed under the Ordinance, whose decision shall be final.
It is specifically provided by s. 51 that the provisions of ss. 47 to 50 inclusive shall not affect the exercise in respect of a certificated teacher of the authority and jurisdiction conferred by ss. 6 and 7 of the Ordinance.
The provisions relating to the employment, dismissal and termination of employment of teachers are to be found at regs. 51, 52 and 55 of the Education Code. These regulations provide as follows:
“51. The appointment, terms of employment, payment, promotion, transfer and termination of employment of teachers shall rest directly with the governing bodies subject to the approval of the Director which shall be previously obtained.
52. (1) The terms of employment of a teacher, either on first appointment, or on transfer, shall be embodied in a letter of appointment from the governing body, or in the case of a teacher whom the manager is authorised to appoint under regulation 6 from such manager.
(2) Every letter of appointment containing a teacher’s terms of employment shall—
(a) state the period of notice in writing which is necessary on either side to terminate the teacher’s employment, which in the case of a head teacher, other than a head teacher holding a provisional certificate, shall be three months, and in the case of other teachers one month; and
(b) state any duties in regard to the giving of religious instruction in the school which are to be performed by the teacher in addition to the duties required of him by section 28 of the Ordinance.
(3) No letter of appointment shall contain anything contrary to these regulations.”
“55. (1) (a) When a teacher is dismissed under section 46 of the Ordinance, the teacher may obtain from the Director a full statement of the cause of his dismissal;
(b) when the employment of a teacher is terminated otherwise than by dismissal under section 46 of the Ordinance, the governing body shall make a report to the Director, containing a full statement of the reasons for the termination of the employment.
(2) Where the employment of a teacher has been terminated and any governing body or manager who contemplates employing him applies to the Director for information as to the cause of such termination, the Director shall furnish the manager with a copy of the report relating thereto.”
The provisions of the Education Code relating to the employment, dismissal and termination of employment of teachers viewed in the light of the provisions of ss. 6 to 9 and 47 to 51 of the Ordinance indicate that the relationship between the governing body and a certificated teacher is not one merely of master and servant.
The procedure to be followed by a board in inquiring into a complaint under s. 47 of the Ordinance is provided by reg. 59 of the Education Code.
Regulation 59 provides as follows:
“59 (1) For any breach of these regulations, for improper conduct while in school, for neglect of duty, misconduct, inefficiency, unfitness, irregularity, or conduct unbecoming a teacher, or lack of discipline on the part of any teacher, the governing body of the school in which the teacher is employed may impose a fine not exceeding $24, or other penalty on the defaulting teacher, but not until the teacher has been informed of the charge against him and has been given an opportunity of exculpating himself.
(2) Where such breach of the regulations, or neglect of duty, misconduct, inefficiency, irregularity or lack of discipline is discovered by the Director or his officers or is otherwise brought to his notice, the Director may inform the governing body of the school in which the teacher is employed, and thereupon it shall be the duty of the governing body to investigate the matter in accordance with paragraph (1) of this regulation and section 46 of the Ordinance.
(3) Any penalty imposed by the governing body shall be subject to confirmation by the Director, who may at his discretion vary the penalty imposed by the governing body.
(4) When in the opinion of the governing body and the Director, or either of them, the penalty to be imposed on a teacher holding a permanent certificate should not amount to dismissal under section 46 of the Ordinance but should be the termination of his employment after notice or his transfer to another school in any capacity, the Director shall, should the teacher so request, thereupon refer the matter to the Committee for their advice.
(5) In any case under these regulations where the Committee advises that a teacher shall be transferred and the teacher declines to accept such transfer his employment shall thereupon be terminated by the governing body.
(6) All fines imposed under this section shall be paid into a fine fund to be in charge of the Director, and to be disbursed, subject to the rules to be made for that purpose by the Director with the approval of the Governor.
(7) If a teacher is interdicted from duty in accordance with section 47 (1) of the Ordinance he shall be allowed to receive one-half of his salary and if the proceedings against the teacher do not result in his dismissal or the termination of his employment or the suspension or cancellation of his certificate he shall be entitled to the full salary he would have received if he had not been interdicted:
Provided that if a teacher is convicted on a criminal charge he shall not receive any salary from the date of conviction pending consideration of his case by the Director.”
Paragraphs (1) and (2) of reg. 59 relate to breaches of the regulations, improper conduct in school, neglect of duty, misconduct, inefficiency, unfitness, irregularity, or conduct unbecoming of a teacher, or lack of discipline on the part of a teacher. These are all disciplinary offences. The governing body is empowered to act of its own motion under paragraph (1) while the Director acts under paragraph (2) as provided for by s. 47 (1) of the Ordinance. The plaintiff was dismissed because of his conviction on a charge of being in possession of prohibited publications contrary to s. 4 of the Undesirable Publications (Prohibition of Importation) Ordinance, 1952. This charge does not fall within any of the categories of disciplinary offences set out in paragraphs (1) and (2) of this regulation. Reference has been made to the proviso to paragraph (7) of reg. 59 and it has been contended by counsel for the plaintiff that this indicates that where a teacher is convicted on a criminal charge the provisions of s. 47 and of reg. 55 must be followed if it is sought to discipline the teacher.
Where a teacher has been convicted by a court of competent jurisdiction on a criminal charge and has not appealed against his conviction or if he has appealed against his conviction and he either abandons his appeal or his appeal is dismissed it is not necessary for the procedure set out at s. 47 (1) and at reg. 59 to be followed.
Any finding on an inquiry by a board contrary to that of a court of competent jurisdiction on the same allegation would be nugatory, so where a competent court has pronounced judgment on a criminal charge laid against a teacher it is not necessary for an inquiry to be made by a board in respect of the same charge.
There was in my view no failure on the part of the defendants to comply with any requirement of the Ordinance or Regulations or indeed with any of the rules of natural justice as to procedure in this matter.
The proviso to paragraph (7) of reg. 59 merely indicates that a teacher, after conviction and until the Director has considered his case, shall receive no salary. In the present case the Director did approve of the plaintiff’s dismissal by his employers following upon his conviction.
The court cannot interfere with the exercise of the Director’s discretion, no question of the bona fides of the exercise of that discretion having been raised.
The plaintiff was validly dismissed by the first- and third-named defendants and his claim for the declarations and injunctions and his alternative claim for damages must fail. In the result the plaintiff fails on all grounds and his claim is dismissed with costs to the defendants to be taxed certified fit for counsel. In the case of counsel for the second-named defendant the order for costs will be limited to the time at which the argument on counsel’s submission in limine was concluded.
Judgment for the defendants.
Solicitors: O. M. Valz (for the plaintiff); H. C. B. Humphrys (for the first-and third-named defendants); Crown Solicitor (for the second-named defendant).

Known Surnames of Sancho of Berbice

 It is accepted, Sancho males, left Demerara. The Sancho males resided in the Canje River
Valley, and on the Corentyne Coast, in the County of Berbice. Jemmy Sancho, Speculation
Village , Canje in February 1862 is the earliest Sancho I have encountered in print relative to Berbice. 

The opinion is the members of the kinship of Sancho of Berbice and Surinam are also
descendants of Sancho of East Coast Demerara. A number of the members of the kinships of Abrams, Batson, Benjamin, Best, Boatswain, Campbell, Ceres, Christian, Cort, Crandon, Davis, Downer, Fingal, Fraser, Freso, George, Haynes, Hazel, Homer, King, La Fleur, Lancaster, Leitch, Marks, Moore, Munroe, Niles, Noble, Nurse, Patterson, Quintin, Reynolds, Ross, Sancho, Sears, Smith, Williams, Wilson, Yaw and Young - and several others of the Corentyne Coast, the Canje River Basin, New Amsterdam, West Coast Berbice, and other locations in Berbice are numbered amongst the descendants of Sancho. Let's talk shall we - soonest?

Sancho family in print

 Sancho family history in print. Clipping showing information of entries  in Roth, Vincent and Delph, Charles Noel (editors) Who is Who in British Guiana, 1945 - 1948 (Fourth Edition)

Sources OGBG

 Sancho in Official Gazette of British Guiana 1903-1919

Sancho of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines

 Sancho of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
Please link Sancho family researchers with the relatives of the Sancho females of Berlin Street, in  Layou,  Saint Vincent.  It is understood Sancho females resided next to the Methodist church on Berlin Street, in  Layou,  in Saint Vincent.  It is possible, Henrietta Sancho and Lydia (Shallow) Sancho, Gladys Thomas, and Wilhelmina (Quashie) Scarborough of Berlin Street, in Layou, are relatives of the descendants of Bentick Sancho and Tuckness Sancho. Therefore, by this means Sancho family researchers are requesting you point them to family historians and other knowledgeable people,  respecting the relatives of Sancho of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines.
Sancho family researchers need to learn who are Sancho people of Trinidad and Saint Vincent.  More, importantly, Sancho family researchers need to ascertain who they really are.
    1. Is it possible,  to link Sancho with the relatives of Lincoln Hinds, William Hinds, Felicia Brown, Adella Sancho, Rachael Hinds of Taylor Town, Mary Sancho of New Adelphi, Donald Cambridge of Back Street, Layou;  Rita Cottle, Henrietta Sancho and Lydia (Shallow) Sancho, Gladys Thomas, and Wilhelmina (Quashie) Scarborough of Berlin Street, in Layou, and Luburd Sancho? 
    2. Is Sancho Lyttle a member of the kinship of Sancho of Saint Vincent? 
    3. How do Donald Cambridge, businessman and iconic figure in Layou relate to the  Sancho females of Berlin Street, Layou? 
    4. How does Donald Cambridge, and Rose Cambridge-Hypolite relate to each other?  
    5.  What is the current name for Taylor Town? 
    6. Who do you recommend Sancho family researchers consult soonest?  
Sancho family researchers need to know and not believe.  Please point Sancho family researchers to our people familiar with Brown and Hinds of Taylor Town, Sancho, Hinds, Cambridge, Hypolite, Cottle, Shallow,  Thomas, Quashie, and Scarborough and their related families in Saint Vincent.  
Please link Sancho family researchers with family historians and historians of Spring Village, Chateaubelair, Layou, Adelphi, and Troumaca, and with the congregants of Methodist and Spiritual Baptist in Saint Vincent – soonest.
Also, please circulate this inquiry to your relatives  and other people of Saint Vincent.
Thanks for your time, tolerance, energy and cooperation.
Email: nagatunkalemuofsanchadwipa@gmail.com 

childrenofsancho@gmail.com 

Public Member Trees for Sancho

 

Luke-Sancho

It is a given not every person surnamed Luke and/or members of the kinship of Luke are descendants of Sancho. The aim of this exercise is to identify the members of the kinship of Sancho. This effort is focused primarily on the immediate relatives of Mrs. Adelaide Sancho-Luke. However, it would be totally illogical not to recognize the possibility that there are likely other links among the people of Luke and Sancho, other than that of David Luke and Adelaide Sancho.
This is part of the up-hill task of accounting for all of the members of the kinship of Sancho, as accurately as humanly possible.
Your input will be greatly appreciated. You are hereby asked to share your knowledge of our people, and/or to point us to sources of information; whereby persons connected to the primary ancestor will be identified. Thanks for your time, tolerance and cooperation.
Whenever you have pertinent information will please share with researchers? Email: nabaclisman@gmail.com

PRIMARY SURNAME: LUKE - The kinship of Sancho: the Descendants of Adelaide (nee Sancho) Luke and her husband David Luke.

ASSOCIATED SURNAMES:
ADAMS, ARMSTRONG, AUSTIN, BARNWELL, BARRY, BLAND, BURKE, CALLIGHAN, FRASER, GARRAWAY, GILES. GRENADA, HAYWOOD (HEYWOOD), LAWRENCE, LUKE, LUTCHMAN, LYNCH, MORRIS, RICHMOND, SANCHO, SEYMOUR, THORNHILL, WARD, WEATHERSPOON, WILLIAMSON,

PRIMARY PERSON OF INTEREST:
Adelaide Sancho; the mother of Theophilus Augustus Luke (1867-1957).
Adelaide Sancho is the member of the kinship of Sancho. Adelaide Sancho is the mother of the kinship of Luke - members of the kinship of Sancho.
I am interested in locating and communicating with the descendants of Sancho. This has led me several families including the Luke. According to the information, I am fortunate to access David Luke and his wife Adelaide (nee Sancho) Luke reproduced several children. It appears the family consisted of at least six children – three girls and three boys, including;

1. Theophilus Augustus Luke, (1867-1957), a Local Preacher at the Methodist Church at Victoria on the East Sea Coast of Demerara.
2. Amelia Luke-Thornhill of Lodge Village, East Bank Demerara.
3. Aunt Baby,
4. Aunt Berth, mother of Eloise,
5. The mother or father of Gladys Lawrence and Gussy Lawrence – and grand parent of Hilton Morris and Sidney Morris.
6. The father of Renny Luke, the father of Josephine Luke, perhaps, George Luke and Henry Luke.

Descendants of Theophilus Augustus Luke and Myra Henrietta Dulcina Caleb:
Jennifer M. Austin, Karen F. Austin, Leon C. Austin, Wallace Samuel Austin, Colleen Barry, Keith Barry, Wilwood Augustus Barry , Ashton Luke, Cheryl Luke, Dulcina Augusta Luke ( 1913- 1994) , Emelda Luke, Etta Luke, George Herbert Westwell Luke (1911-1977), George Errol Luke, Hazel Luke, Henrietta Agatha Alethea Luke, (-1974), Hernetta Luke, Jennifer Luke, Joseph Theophilus Luke [aka Stanley Luke] (1918 -) , Lucille Hyacinth Luke ( 1915- 2006), Macein Luke, Marie Luke , Oliver Luke, Pennifer Luke, Salome Eudora Luke ( 1910- 1998 ) , Theophilus Augustus Fiddian Luke ( 1908 - 1998) , Vanessa Luke, Vanetta Luke, Wendella Luke, Westwell Luke, Zaneta Luke

Descendants of Willie Luke (perhaps, Wilfred Luke),
Odessa Fraser, Dawn Jafferally, Faye Jafferally, Pam Jafferally, Patrick Jafferally, Bunny Luke (Policeman), Coretta Luke, Dolly Luke, Duncan Luke, Essie Luke, Franklin Luke, Gordon Luke (Minister of Religion), Guy Luke, Henry Luke (perhaps Wilfred Henry Luke), Joan Luke, Joy Luke, Maize Luke, Patricia Luke, Samuel Theophilus Luke, Samuel Theophilus Luke (aka Michael Luke), Seifred Leroy Luke (aka Fred James/Fred Luke), Waveney Luke, Jeffery Smith, Joan Smith, Walter Smith

Clement Garraway, Colin G. Garraway (Minister of Religion), Colleen Garraway, Mark Garraway, Augustus Lawrence (Gussie Lawrence), Cedric Lawrence, Gladys Lawrence, Ivor “Boba” Lawrence (Police Officer), Joe Lawrence, Oscar Lawrence, Samuel Lawrence (Police Officer), Winston “Saygo” Lawrence (farmer and Village Overseer of Victoria-Belfield Village District), Ann Morris, Audrey Morris, Fred Morris, Hilton Morris, Lennox Morris, Sydney Morris, Una Weatherspoon (wife of Stanley Barnwell), Oswald Bland (Ossie Bland), Merle Grenada, Asquith Richmond, Outan Bland, Cousin Maude Richmond (perhaps a Miss Bristol), Dunstan Richmond, Asquith Richmond, Birdie Bland??.

The Bland/Richmond family resided in the vicinity of the Pilgrim Holiness Church at Nabaclis on the East Sea Coast of Demerara.

Luke of Plaisance
Abigail Luke, Allison Luke, Conrad Alexander Luke (Schoolmaster), Debbie Luke (probably Debbie Thomas), Gloria Luke,James Henry Augustus Luke, Joseph William Luke, Lillian Luke (probaby Lilly Luke, schoolteacher), Monty Luke, Tom Luke (Schoolmaster), Stella Althea Luke (Nurse/Midwife, Plaisance Health Center),Walford Luke , Catherine Miller (Typist Clerk), Marcelle Miller, Mary Angela Miller (Missionary Minister of Religion, Glory Light Tabernacle, Plaisance), Monica Imelda Miller (Social Worker),

KNOWN
I know; the mother of Theophilus Augustus Luke is Miss Adelaide Sancho. The members of this Luke family migrated to several communities including Plaisance, Kitty and Lodge. There was Hutchinson Luke and his brother May Luke had butchery in the vicinity of the Railway Station near Garnett Street at Kitty Village, on the East Sea Coast of Demerara.
Luke operated a bakery at lot 21 Princess Street in Lodge village, on the East Bank of the Demerara River.

BELIEF:

1. Miss Adelaide Sancho, the mother of Theophilus Augustus Luke is an immediate relative and member of the following kinships; ASSANAH, BRISTOL, BOBB, HARMON, HARRY, HAYWOOD, JACOBS, LAWRENCE, among others unknown to me at this period.
2. Papa Willie Luke is a son of Adelaide Sancho and her husband David Luke.
3. Wilfred Luke is the name of Papa Willie Luke,
4. Papa Willie Luke is the father of Samuel Theophilus Luke, Maize Luke and Henry Luke.
5. Mrs. Callighan is the mother of Mrs. Nelly Mackie, Mrs. Seymour, Ella “Butt-Up” Europe , Mrs. Mary Chichester, Mrs. Irene Graham and about twelve others.
6. Mrs. Callighan is an immediate relative of Adelaide Sancho, perhaps a sister or a daughter but could well be a first cousin.
7. The legal name of Henry Luke, the brother of Samuel Theophilus Luke, Maize Luke is very likely Wilfred Henry Luke.
8. Maurice Luke was resident near Lam’s Grocery Store, Gomes and Keith Booker at Golden Grove.
9. Maurice Luke is the father of Derek Luke the New Jersey born American Actor who played the lead role in the film ; Antwone Fisher is perhaps a member of the kinship of Luke of Golden Grove.
   
   ENQUIRY:
10. What are the names of the children of David Luke and Adelaide Luke?
11. What are the names of the descendants (children) of the children of David Luke and Adelaide Luke?
12. What is the name of the father of Adelaide Sancho?
13. Who are the siblings of Adelaide Sancho?
14. Who are the descendants of the members of the kinship of Luke?
15. Who operated a bakery at lot 21 Princess Street in Lodge village, on the East Bank of the Demerara River?
16. Who are immediate relatives of Hutchinson Luke and his brother May Luke had butchery in the vicinity of the Railway Station near Garnett Street at Kitty Village.
17. Who were resident at Golden Grove, Nabaclis, Victoria, Plaisance, Vryheid’s Lust, Kitty, and Lodge?
18. What are the vital statistics of David Luke, Adelaide Luke, Theophilus Augustus Luke, and Amelia Thornhill?
19. Who are immediate relatives of Susan Giles, the mother of Miss Adelaide Sancho?
20. Can you identify the children, the siblings and the descendants of the siblings of Theophilus Augustus Luke, and Amelia Thornhill, and the other members of their kinship?
21. Is Conrad Luke a member of the kinship of Luke and a descendant of David Luke and Adelaide Luke?
22. Who can assist with identifying, locating, communicating, with the members of the kinship of Luke – the descendants of Sancho?
23. What is the relationship of Adelaide Sancho-Luke to the father of Maize Luke-Jafferally, Samuel Luke, and Henry Luke, and Mrs. Callighan?
24. Can you identify the following?
    Miss Seymour, the wife of George Herbert Westwell Luke (1911-1977), Cyril Luke (son of Armstrong of Nabaclis), Maurice Luke (UK & New Jersey, USA) , and Ismay Seaforth-Luke.
25. The known surnames of the descendants of David Luke and Adelaide Sancho.
26. The names of the father of Samuel Theophilus Luke, Maize Luke-Jefferali and Henry Luke.
27. The names of the brothers and sisters of Samuel Theophilus Luke, senior.
28. The name of the mother of Samuel Theophilus Luke, senior.
29. The names of the children and spouses of Samuel Theophilus Luke, Maize Luke-Jefferalli and Henry Luke.
30. Also please list the dates of births, Dates of Marriages, and the dates of death of our relatives when known. Even the months and the years of the events may very well be useful and lead to locating sources of information.
31. The name of Luke and his wife Miss Heywood (Haywood) and their children and other relatives.
32. What is the correct surname Haywood or Heywood?
33. What are the names of the parents, siblings, children and ancestor of Cyril Luke?
34. How does Cyril Luke relate to Samuel Theophilus Luke?
35. The contact information for all the members of the kinship of Sancho, which you have and/ or can obtain.
36. Also who do you recommend I contact and consult regarding the descendants of Adelaide Sancho and her husband David Luke, and the other members of the kinship of Sancho?
    

PREMISES:

1. Susan Giles is the mother of the kinships of Callighan and Luke – and numerous other members of the kinship of Sancho.
2. Susan Giles was birthed about 1827.
3. Susan Giles is an immediate relative of Leah Giles, a shareholder of Golden Grove Village, East Coast Demerara.
4. One of these three members of the kinship of Sancho; John Sancho, Bentick Sancho, and Tuckness Sancho, is the father of Adelaide Sancho.

Joseph Theophilus Luke also known as Stanley Luke is quoted as saying in an article, “those good old days at Victoria”, written by John Rickford and printed on page fifteen of the Sunday Chronicle issued for Sunday, August 25, 1974; his father was from Nabaclis. He moved to Victoria in 1895.
Cousin Maude Richmond, perhaps a Miss Bristol, the mother of Dunstan Richmond and Asquith Richmond and her sister, Birdie, the mother of Merle Grenada, Oswald Bland, and Outan Bland resided in the vicinity of the Pilgrim Holiness Church at Nabaclis on the East Sea Coast of Demerara.

REASONS FOR THE INTERESTS:
The need is to determine and thereby ascertain, the exact nature of the relationship of Adelaide Sancho, the mother of Theophilus Augustus Luke to the kinship of Sancho and particularly to one of three brothers; Bentick Sancho, John Sancho and Tuckness Sancho.



PERSONS OF INTERESTS:

1. THEOPHILUS AUGUSTUS LUKE (–d. Monday, October 21, 1957);
2. AMELIA THORNHILL of Lodge Village;
3. ASHTON LUKE, son of DOROTHY BACCHUS;
4. ROYAL LUKE, GLEN LUKE (United Kingdom), WINSTANLEY LUKE, CAMILLE LUKE and VANESSA LUKE in Brooklyn, New York, USA;
5. GEORGE HERBERT WESTWELL LUKE (Thursday, August 3, 1911 – November 1977);
6. The brother and sister; GUSSY LAWRENCE and GLADYS LAWRENCE of Victoria Village and her sons; HILTON MORRIS and SIDNEY MORRIS (with Edward Morris);
7. JOSEPHINE LUKE, ELOISE, ELIZA (LIZ);
8. The relatives of Luke, the owner of a Bakery at 21 Princess Street Lodge, Village, East Bank Demerara;
9. The relatives of HUTCHINSON LUKE and MAY LUKE, owners of Butcher Shop at Garnett Street near the Railway Station at Kitty Village, East Coast Demerara;
10. Members of the kinships of Luke of the villages of Kitty, Plaisance, Golden Grove, Nabaclis, and Victoria, on the East Coast of Demerara, and Lodge on the East Bank of the Demerara River;
11. MAUDE RICHMOND, Nabaclis Village;
12. JOB AUGUSTUS LUKE;
13. WILFRED ALEXANDER LUKE (May 7, 1897-October 12, 1960) Carpenter;
14. EDWARD MATHIAS LUKE (October 31, 1948);
15. JOSEPH WILLIAM LUKE: Catechist, Plaisance, Schoolmaster at Better Hope, died while still being employed;
16. STELLA ALTHEA LUKE: Nurse-Midwife; Plaisance, East Coast Demerara c.16th, March, 1957.
17. JAMES HENRY AUGUSTUS LUKE: Boiler Maker, Transport and Harbours Department, Plaisance, East Coast Demerara and Diamond, East Bank, Demerara;
18. LINNET O. LUKE and Eileen K. George (Howard University Alumni: Directory of Graduates 1870-1980: page 732);
19. CHARLES LUKE – President of Friendship Wesleyan Guild – c. 1st. January, 1919;
20. ROBERT LUKE who married Caroline London, and they reproduced a daughter GLORIA PATRICIA LUKE, Mahaica, East Coast, Demerara;
21. OSCAR O. LUKE: Buxton, East Coast, Demerara. (c. 1926.) ;
22. MICHAEL LUKE: Mason, Lot 36 Stanley town, New Amsterdam, Berbice;
23. QUASHEY LUKE: Shareholder of Golden Grove Village;
24. CONRAD ALEXANDER LUKE: Schoolmaster, (Born July 10, 1919 at Plaisance died: May 29, 2004);
25. LILLIAN LUKE : Plaisance R. C.1923 ;
26. W. E. LUKE: Mahaicony 1950;
27. CLAYTON LUKE (Labourer, Golden Grove, East Coast, Demerara, c. 12 July 1960);
28. JOSEPH BENJAMIN LUKE (Clerk, Bookers Stores, Georgetown);
29. HENRY HERCULES LUKE (Carpenter, Golden Grove, East Coast, Demerara);
30. MOSES LUKE (Car owner, Bagotville, West Bank, Demerara);
31. EBENEZER LUKE (Overseer, Mahaicony, East Coast, Demerara);
32. JOAN P. J. LUKE – Arts (1955);
33. ALVIN LUKE: Resident, Cummings Lodge

Luke c. May 19, 1928

1. JOSEPH WILLIAM LUKE: Plaisance, East Coast Demerara.
2. JAMES HENRY LUKE: Plantation Diamond, East Bank Demerara.
3. GEORGE ALBERT LUKE: Victoria, East Coast Demerara.
4. CORNELIUS LUKE: Victoria, East Coast Demerara.
5. MOSES LUKE: Bagotville, West Bank Demerara.
6. GRANT E. LUKE: La Grange Police Station, West Bank Demerara.
   Source: Official Gazette of British Guiana – May 19, 1928: Page 1,591.

GEORGE HERBERT WESTWELL LUKE
Head Teacher, Ann's Grove Roman Catholic School, East Coast, Demerara.
RESIDES: at Victoria, East Coast Demerara.
BORN: August 3, 1911, at Victoria, East Coast, Demerara, to Theophilus Augustus Luke, Painter, and his wife, Myrah Dulcina nee Caleb.
EDUCATED: at Ann's Grove Methodist School, East Coast, Demerara, and
Government Training College, Georgetown.
Holds Teacher's Certificate, Class 1.
Was a Pupil Teacher at St. Stephen's Cane Grove, East Coast, Demerara, Kingston Methodist, Georgetown and Friendship Methodist, East Coast Demerara.
1932-42 --- Assistant Teacher, Victoria Roman Catholic School, East Coast, Demerara.
1942 --- Assistant Teacher, St. Mary's Roman Catholic School.
1944 --- First Assistant Malgre Tout Roman Catholic School.
1945 --- Acting Head Teacher, Malgre Tout Roman Catholic School.
1946 --- Present Appointment.
RECREATION: - Walking.
HOBBIES: - Music, Gardening and Reading.
Is Organist and Choirmaster Victoria Roman Catholic Church, since 1942.
SOURCE: Roth, Vincent & Delph, Charles Noel (Editors) Who's Who in British Guiana [1945-48, Fourth Edition] The Daily Chronicle Company Limited, Georgetown, British Guiana, 1948]: page 330.

JAMES HENRY AUGUSTUS LUKE,
Boiler Maker, Transport and Harbours Department.
RESIDES: at Plaisance, East Coast, Demerara.
BORN: 1889 at Aurora , Essequibo , to Joseph William Luke, Catechist, and his wife, Nancy, nee Britton.
EDUCATED: at St. Paul ’s Anglican School , Plaisance, East Coast, Demerara.
Was a Boiler Maker, Foreman Plantation Diamond for 20 years.
Also Foreman at Air Base.
MARRIED: 3rd, August, 1921:- Matilda Harris.
CHILDREN: Has four sons and two daughters.
RECREATION: Cricket.
1923:- Erected Iron Chimney without scaffold at Plantation Diamond.
SOURCE: Roth, Vincent & Delph, Charles Noel (Editors)Who's Who in British Guiana [1945-48, Fourth Edition] The Daily Chronicle Company Limited, Georgetown, British Guiana, 1948]: Page 330.

WILFRED ALEXANDER LUKE
Carpenter.
RESIDES: at 94 Second Street, Georgetown.
BORN: May 7, 1897, at Golden Grove, East Coast, Demerara, to Job Augustus Luke, Farmer, and his wife, Mary, nee Glasgow.
EDUCATED: at Golden Grove Methodist School .
Has been a Volunteer Sanitary Inspector.
MARRIED: September 13, 1933: Eugenie Alberta Sandiford.
CHILDREN: Has three sons and two daughters.
RECREATION: - Cricket.
HOBBY: - Reading.
SOURCE: Roth, Vincent & Delph, Charles Noel (Editors)Who's Who in British Guiana [1945-48, Fourth Edition] The Daily Chronicle Company Limited, Georgetown, British Guiana, 1948]: Page 330.


Let’s talk, enlighten me, who among the folks listed below, do your recognize? I am referring to their link to Adelaide Sancho.

EAST BANK, DEMERARA
Keith Luke [Driver], John Luke [Police], Michael Francis Luke-King [Driver] Agricola

GEORGETOWN
Shellon Arlyn Luke, Deon Pheona Luke, Lexie Lanna Luke, Deryck Luke [Refrigerator Technician], Helen Elizabeth Luke, Mildred Luke, Reginald Roopchan Luke,

KITTY/ CAMPBELLVILLE/ NEWTOWN/ CUMMINGS LODGE/ SOPHIA/ PATTENSEN/ TURKEYEN.
Inez Luke, Claire Allison Sharon Luke [Vendor] , Carol Luke [Domestic], Sharon Eastilanda Ruth Luke [Joiner] ,Chomie Kenacia Luke, Coretta Osmine Luke [Nurse] , Ayanna Andito Luke ,David Josephus Luke [Supervisor] , Rashleigh Anthony Luke ,Trilton Andre Luke [Prison Officer] ,Alvin Luke [Gardener] ,George Luke , Hermeena Gomattie Luke ,Kennard Luke [Seaman] ,George Anthony Luke ,Edrice Luke , Lionel Luke-King [Office Assistant] ,Catherine Luke ,

TUCVILLE/ RUIMVELDT
Ismay Luke , Grace Luke-Fraser [Supervisor] ,Verna Gwendolyn Luke [Medex] , Samuel Luke [Conductor] ,Andrea Amanda Luke [Cleaner] ,Annette Patricia Luke ,Christopher Samuel Luke , Claudia Gennita Luke [Accounts Clerk] ,Cyndia Patricia Luke ,Henry Gilbert Luke [Contractor] , Conrad Cuthbert Luke [Lecturer] , Niaal Anthony Luke [Technician] ,Carol Candace Luke-Edwards , Anthony Luke-King [Seaman] , Michael Uriah Luke-King [Engineer] , Alanka Luke , Levi Apata Otinga Luke , Wilfred Fitz Herbert Luke [Minister of Religion] ,Mercedes Salome Luke-Williams ,

LODGE
Beverly Ann Luke, Michele Althea Luke, Lucille Ivy Luke-Burke, Zelda Niekesha Athaliah Luke, Princess Irene Luke [Vendor],

LA PENITENCE
Sherwin Nelson Luke, Clarice Luke, Curtis A. Luke [Vendor], Hazel Ann Luke [Police], Victor Luke [Goldsmith], Devon Marvin Junior Luke, Debbie Monetta Luke [Manager],

ALBOUYSTOWN/ CHARLESTOWN / BOURDA/ WORTMANVILLE/ LACY TOWN/ WERK-EN-RUST
Esther Helena Luke [Charwoman], Joyann Maria Luke , Doreen Dularie Luke-King , Edward Peter Luke-King [Craftsman] , Shawn Luke King , Elizabeth Ann Luke-King , Martin Luke-King , Pamela Beatrice Luke [Processor], Eze Oguere Sinclair Luke [Inspector], Bernadette Petronella Luke [Seamstress] , Denise Elizabeth Luke , Hazel Elizabeth Luke , Hilda Luke [Constable] , Grace Amelia Luke [Chief Clerk] , Hannah L. Luke-Edwards [Secretary] , Mark Luke-Edwards , Marlon Charles Luke , Adewale Luke [Credit Officer] , Dale Ann Luke [Clerk] , Debereen Osline Luke , James Anthony Luke [Vendor] , Floyd Orin Luke [Vendor] , Delon Luke , Tannis Luke ,

PLAISANCE/ SPARENDAAM/ VRYHEID 'S LUST
Donald Alexander Luke [Carpenter] , Eunice Olivia Luke [Pump Operator] , Petronella Nicola Luke , Rodwell Kelvin Luke [Pump Operator] , Cecilene Luke [House Keeper] , Daphne Almanta Luke [House Keeper] , Eileen Almenta Luke [House Keeper] , Joseph Benjamin Luke [Operator] , Lennox Luke [Carpenter] , Lennox Kemptay Oundell Luke , Reginald Emmanuel Luke [Carpenter] , Tanefa Natasha Luke , Dionne Candace Odessa Luke , Zoe Mae Shana Luke [Teacher] ,

BETERVERWAGTING
Angela Maria Luke-King

PARADISE
Lloyda Abiola Luke [Teacher]

BUXTON /FRIENDSHIP
Glezen Millard Luke [Stevedore], Janice Marlene Luke, Leslie Sharon Luke Duncan [Teacher], Carrie Luke, Denise Luke [Weeder], Patricia Ann Luke, William Luke [Vendor]

ENMORE/ HASLINGTON
Grant Eli Luke, Arlington Junior Luke [Labourer], Donna Luke [Labourer], Leal Anthony Luke [Office Assistant], Lesley A. Luke [Police], Leslie Junior Luke, Mary Ann Luke [Teacher], Royston Loris Luke [Teacher],

NABACLIS /GOLDEN GROVE
Ayanna Chaka Melaka Luke , Ishelli Oyinola Luke , Kwesi Nkosi Luke , Nika Fola Felecia Luke [Teacher] , Odinga Nkrumah Luke , Sylvia Lynette Luke [Librarian] , Leroy Luke [Salesman] , Michael Luke [Tributor] , Siegfried Letroy Luke [Security Officer] , Samuel Theophilus Luke [Consultant], Aslyne-Elsonaugustus Luke [Clerical Officer] , May Eugenie Luke, Richard Lester Solomon-Luke ,Althea Luke [Cleaner] ,Debra Luke,Laura Viola Luke , Roel Romana Luke , Venus Luke [Huckster] , Nigel Luke [Mason] , Collette Devaughn Luke [Technician] , Dolores Luke , Duncan Owen Llewellyn Luke [Police] , Linden Owen Luke [Welder] , Ollata Phyletia Luke [Teacher] , Troydon Duncan Luke [Driver] , Keisha Melissa Otho-Luke ,

VICTORIA
Rondel Kenven Luke [Soldier] , Donna H. Luke , Jennifer Roxanne Luke , Alvina Anna Luke , Aminta Amaris Luke , Azalia Audris Luke , Errol Lennox Luke [Lecturer] , Fern Jacqueline Luke , Janet Lynette Luke , Kwame Patrice Luke , Lynton Kingswood Luke [Clerk] , Marcella Clarewen Luke [Hairdresser] , Nadata Alicia Luke , Sherwin Saint-Anthony Luke [Accounts Clerk] ,

DAVID ROSE HOUSING SCHEME
Andrew Luke, Basil Luke [Farmer], Naresh Luke [Police], Parbatie Luke, Rosalyn Luke,